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Money Growth Has Slowed Sharply—Should Anybody Care?  
John A. Tatom 
 
Milton Friedman, the most influential economist of the 20
th
 century and one of greatest 
economists of all time, died on November 16, 2006 at age 94.   He will be remembered as 
the most articulate and insightful advocate since Adam Smith of free markets and 
capitalism.  He was the winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark award in 1951 and the 
Nobel Prize in 1976.  He made major contributions to monetary theory and policy issues.  
He was famous for his conclusion that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon,” and for the related notion that ultimately the only thing a central bank, 
such as the Federal Reserve System, can control is inflation, and not output, employment, 
interest rates or other items that politicians and other interest groups typically urge central 
banks to control.  
 
This article focuses on some of his more important ideas about money and monetary 
policy, both as a memorial and because his views remain controversial in their 
application, although not in their general acceptance. Friedman emphasized the role of 
the quantity of money and its growth rate in determining the pace of inflation and, when 
volatile, in causing business cycles. He also was a strong advocate of “rules versus 
discretion” in the conduct of monetary policy. In his view, the Federal Reserve has been 
the principal source of cyclical instability and major inflation episodes since its founding. 
He concluded that central banks should be given a rule to increase a measure of the 
nation‟s money stock at a given fixed rate per year so that discretion in trying to improve 
economic performance would be removed.   
 
By the 1980s, Friedman had been extremely persuasive so that economists, policymakers 
and ordinary citizens had learned the lessons of the importance of money and how to 
properly conduct monetary policy.  For example, the US Congress mandated in 1975 
(House Concurrent Resolution 133) that the Fed report annual targets for the growth rates 
of money and credit. This directive was formalized in amendments to the Federal Reserve 
Act in 1977. By 1987, however, the Fed stopped reporting a target for the narrow 
measure of money used in transactions called M1 and by 1992 they downplayed targets 
for a broader measure, actually preferred by Friedman, called M2.  When the relevant 
statute expired in 2000, the Fed ceased stating any target which might influence market 
expectations or be useful as a standard for performance or accountability.   
 
The reason that US policymakers ignore monetary aggregates is that deregulation and 
financial innovations have distorted the measures of money so that there is no stable 
empirical relationship between monetary aggregate measures and nominal spending or 
income, or with inflation. As a result, while Friedman‟s greatest contribution to monetary 
policy, the importance of controlling the quantity of money in the economy in order to 
control inflation and stabilize output and employment, has been widely accepted, it has 
only been implemented in highly abstract and immeasurable terms. 
 
Friedman always argued that it did not matter which measure of money one chose in 
order to conduct monetary policy because they all usually moved up and down in similar 
patterns. The chart shows that for M1 and M2, this is generally true, as well as for a 
measure of M1 adjusted for retail sweep accounts that, due to a technical innovation in 
1994, began to be swept into higher-interest bearing accounts that did not have reserve 
requirements and were not part of M1. The innovation and its effects are discussed in 
Anderson and Rasche (2001).  There are periods when the two measures, and after 1993 
the three measures, showed divergent movements, but generally their growth rates did 
move up and down together, as Friedman suggested.  
 
 
Growth rates of monetary aggregates often follow similar paths
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The adjusted M1 series is the least distorted by financial innovation and bears the closest 
relationship to economic activity and inflation.  Sharp slowings in adjusted M1 are 
accompanied, or soon followed, by the onset of recessions.  Recently this was visible for 
the slowing in M1-adjusted growth in 1999-2000, which was followed by the slowing of 
the economy in 2000-01, and for the subsequent monetary-led rebound.  The latest 
slowing in monetary growth occurred from mid-2004 to the end of 2005 and is 
presumably related, at least in part, to the slowing in real GDP growth that began earlier 
this year.     
 
Why has the Fed done so well? 
The economy has been spared a replay of earlier monetary policy mistakes despite the 
reduced focus on the quantity of money.  Friedman recognized the superior job that the 
Fed has done since 1987 in bringing inflation down and in keeping it down during the 
Greenspan era. (See He Has Set a Standard).  This was an astounding vote of approval by 
an economist who had built a reputation for seeing no positive benefit to having a Fed 
with discretionary power to change the quantity of money, ever in the history of the Fed. 
But he was quick to point out that the achievements of the Fed from 1987 to 2006 were 
the result of the leadership of Chairman Greenspan, not to some new found institutional 
process or procedure. He also neglected to mention the two recession in 1990-91 and 
2001. Speaking Alan Greenspan‟s support for discretion and opposition to rules, 
Freidman said, 
 
“Now that his 18-year stint as Chairman of the Fed is finished, I must confess 
that his performance has persuaded me that he is right – in his own case.” 
(emphasis added)   
 
In his letter to Gregory Mankiw, a leading Harvard economist and recent Chairman of the 
President‟s Council of Economic Advisers, Friedman reiterated his critique of central 
bankers, noting that: 
 
“I have come to the conclusion that central bankers have done a wonderful job of 
pulling the wool over the eyes of economists.  They led us all to believe that 
maintaining a relatively stable price level is a very difficult problem that requires 
the judgment of the wisest of experienced bankers and business people. 
…Nothing that I have observed in recent decades has led me to change my mind 
about the desirability of a monetary rule which simply increased the quantity of 
money at a fixed rate month after month, year after year.  That rule would get rid 
of the mistakes and that is probably about all you could expect to get from a 
monetary system.”   
 
Perhaps the deterioration of acceptance of Friedman‟s insight is most evident in Gregory 
Mankiw‟s suggestion in recent correspondence with  Friedman, that the earlier poor 
performance of the Fed was due to bad luck, and the successes under Greenspan were 
simply good luck (See his response in Friedman, (“Letter from Milton” 2006)   
 
A middle view, and perhaps the dominant view today, is that the Fed has focused on 
monetary aggregates and inflation control by more aggressive settings of the federal 
funds rate, the rate at which financial institutions borrow and lend, generally overnight, 
funds held on deposit at the Federal Reserve as reserves.  A given change in the fed funds 
rate will bring about the appropriate change in the growth rate of money, even if the latter 
cannot be observed or measured with precision.  It is reminiscent to many observers of 
the story of the emperor who had no clothes. Policymakers are victims of the same 
cognitive dissonance as academic economists: they study and prepare policy views on 
monetary policy without mentioning, measuring, or being accountable for money growth.    
 
A Focus on Money is Still Important Abroad 
In the rest of the world, attention to monetary aggregates remains stronger.  For example, 
the founding of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998 was premised on a continued 
focus on monetary aggregates, following the famous success of the German Bundesbank 
in targeting monetary aggregates in order to secure price stability.  On November 9-10 of 
this year, the ECB held a conference on “The Role of Money and Monetary Policy in the 
Twenty-first Century.”  The purpose of the meeting was fundamental. The President of 
the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, reflected the depth of the issue when he concluded that, 
while there is room for refinements to the intellectual framework used as a basis for 
monetary policy deliberations,  “I remain convinced that we should not discard elements 
– such as monetary analysis – that have served central banks well in the past.”        
 
President Trichet highlighted that the use of a monetary growth pillar and its associated 
“careful analysis of monetary developments in real time” as “helping the ECB shape its 
assessment of the economic situation and the associated risks to price stability,” as well 
as “improve its policy decisions.”  Further, he noted the importance attached to the 
monetary pillar has “contributed to shaping agents‟ expectations in a manner which 
enhanced the credibility of the ECB.”   
 
The absence of monetary targets in the US provides a vacuum, of sorts. Policymakers are 
aware that a policy regime change and/or poor performance in achieving low inflation 
could incite pressure on the Fed to restore monetary aggregate targets in order to provide 
a means to monitor, assess and hold accountable their behavior. The drive to implement 
an inflation target is part of Fed‟s response to this potential problem.  It is doubtful that 
the Fed will restore a monetary aggregate target, but at least a few policymakers will 
secretly be reviewing monetary developments before decisions are taken, even in 
America.  And a consensus of analysts and policymakers will continue to propagate the 
mantra that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”    
 
Milton Friedman continued to be active right up to his death.  The Wall Street Journal 
published his last article on November 17, the day following his death. In it, he compared 
the path of money growth surrounding the Great Depression and the end of stock price 
bubbles in the early 1990s in Japan and in 2000 in the US.  He showed that cyclical 
slowdowns were predicted by slowing money growth and that the cyclical slowing was 
larger, the larger was the slowing in money growth. 
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